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The Ethics of Intercultural Communication 
 
Introduction 
For some time, the role of culture in language education within schools, universities and 
professional communication has received increasing attention (Corbett, 2003). This area of 
pedagogic activity is referred to as ‘intercultural communication’; the attribute of being able to 
communicate with interlocutors from other cultures is termed ‘intercultural competence’ (Feng, 
Byram & Fleming, 2009); and a person who possesses this attribute has been dubbed the 
‘intercultural speaker’ (Kramsch, 1998; Byram, 2008, pp. 57-77). The aim of this paper is to 
disclose, critique and circumvent the implicit ethical imperative which underwrites this area of 
inquiry. Indeed, across many areas of contemporary discursive practice there appears to be an 
incitement to communicate with the other, the ethical grounds for which remain undisclosed and 
unproblematised. The central argument in the paper identifies two ‘aporias’, in the sense of 
untraversable boundaries, logical contradictions or antinomies (Derrida, 1993), which arise from 
the ontological and axiological assumptions of intercultural communication: first, they contain an 
unstated impetus towards a universal consciousness; second, the truth claims of much of 
intercultural communication (IC) discourse are grounded in an implicit appeal to a transcendental 
moral signified. Inter alia, we contend that these features constitute the study of intercultural 
communication as ‘totality’ (Levinas, 1969/2007, 1998/2009) or as a ‘metaphysics of presence’ 
(Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1981). We then propose more considered and radical ethical grounds for 
intercultural pedagogy and praxis. 
 
Intercultural Consciousness  
Intercultural communication aims to encourage mutual understanding and dialogue across 
cultural divides in ways that not only consolidate the communities to which its members belong, 
but also win over the sceptical.  In particular, it seeks to raise awareness of the role of language 
in constituting national and supra-national identities and cultures (Holliday, 2010). This includes 
not only subscribing to radical intercultural pedagogies (Shi-xu & Wilson, 2001), but also 
envisaging more cosmopolitan subjects who traverse the transnational terrain with openness 
towards, and tolerance of, the other (Starkey, 2007). These goals are often expressed as a desire 
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for the transformation of intercultural consciousness, and are realized pedagogically through 
bringing about a deep-seated change in the mind or consciousness of the intercultural speaker, 
e.g.: 
 
Through competence-based IC training, trainers can mindfully transform the mindsets, 
affective habits and behavioural routines of the trainees and help them to communicate 
adaptively across cultures (Ting-Toomey, 2010, p. 21).  
 
Furthermore, in the context of the expanding European Union (EU), Byram (2008) proposes that 
such a transformation embrace a measure of democratic participation – not just within the 
political culture of the  nation state, but also within that of pan-national political groupings. 
[E]ducation for intercultural citizenship expects to create change in the individual, to 
promote their learning. Becoming an intercultural citizen involves psychological and 
behavioural change including change in self-perception and understanding of one’s 
relationships to social groups (p. 187). 
 
Such pedagogic goals contain a weak and a strong claim with regard to the intercultural 
speaker’s sense of self. The weak claim suggests that the intercultural speaker is able to 
recognise difference in the beliefs, attitudes and values of the other, and tolerate this difference. 
This already entails a certain shift in the speaker’s self-consciousness. The strong claim is that 
the intercultural speaker recognises difference in the beliefs, attitudes and values of the other, 
embraces them and in so doing becomes ‘transcultured’. For example, some form of hybridized 
consciousness appears to be entailed in Kim’s (2005) socio-psychological account of cross-
cultural adaption, positioned within the mainstream, functionalist strand of US intercultural 
communication. 
[A]n increasingly intercultural identity and selfhood emerges from extensive 
experiences of stress and adaptation. In this process, we are likely to see a blurring of 
lines between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Our old identity is never completely replaced by another. 
Instead, our identity is transformed into something that will always contain the old and 
the new side by side to form a perspective that allows more openness and acceptance of 
differences in people, an understanding of ‘both-and’, and a capacity to participate in 
the depth of aesthetic and emotional experience of others (pp. 395-6).  
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The strong claim is commonly implied by much of the literature in the field, as a construct which 
sits below the surface of the discourse and is not in plain view.  Asante and Yoshitaka (2008), for 
example, in commenting on the IC field in a recent collection, indirectly draw our attention to it.   
Scholars writing in intercultural communication have seen the tremendous advance 
made by expanded consciousness […]. Implied in all of the selections in this collection 
is the idea that the people of the world can communicate. There is a sense that we are 
against conflict and in support of the harmonious coexistence of humans […]. It is 
actually the only reason why we communicate, that is, to make ourselves understood in 
ways that produce harmony (p. 6). 
 
It is often in the dual notions of an expanded consciousness and the harmonious (co)existence of 
peoples that IC discourse frequently implies the strong claim, because both are dependent upon a 
conception of wholeness, or a movement towards wholeness as the basis of their comprehension. 
It follows then that if existing human consciousness is limited and needs to be expanded, then 
intercultural consciousness must be a more complete consciousness, or at least a consciousness 
that is moving towards an ideal of completeness.   If we support the harmonious concord of 
humans as an end goal, then the parallel implication is that it requires an intercultural 
consciousness that is equal to the task.  It seems to us, therefore, that there is an implicit endpoint 
to the strong claim of intercultural communication, which actually goes against the grain of the 
recognition of difference according to which the field of intercultural communication subsists.  
This is the development of a universal consciousness in which difference is effaced. That this 
projected endpoint – the desire for oneness – may be temporally beyond a statement’s immediate 
intent, does not negate the fact that it is still present beneath the surface of the discourse.  It is 
this  desire for oneness which provides the strong claim’s ‘metaphysics of presence’. By this we 
refer to an implied desire for conceptual fulfilment and purity in the discourse, in the process of 
which the consciousness of the intercultural speaker is transformed and the difference between 
the self and the other erased.   
 
In this respect, IC discourse appears to echo the oneness of the Hegelian dialectic, according to 
which the history of humankind involves the transformational development of the collective 
human spirit towards full consciousness: 
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World history merely shows how the spirit gradually attains consciousness and the will 
to truth; it progresses from its early glimmerings to major discoveries and finally to a 
state of complete consciousness […]. The principles of the national spirits in their 
necessary progression are themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, which 
ascends through them in the course of history to its consummation in an all embracing 
totality (Hegel, 1822/1999, p. 404).  
 
Here, national identities appear as disparate ‘national spirits’ which are only elements in a wider 
global consciousness, that is, a ‘universal spirit’ (Geist) which is the totality of a collective 
consciousness. For Hegel, history marks the gradual transcendence of the circumscribed national 
spirits towards a universal ‘Spirit’ or ‘Mind’ by which humankind attains full consciousness. 
This occurs as a staged awakening of Mind: an incremental transformation of consciousness 
through time, towards an absolute knowledge and understanding which marks the end of history.  
 
This drive towards universal consciousness appears to us to be a principal – although hitherto 
unacknowledged and untheorised – implication of IC discourse. The intercultural ideal is imbued 
with the Enlightenment principle of presence as the satisfactory repletion of ideas and outcomes, 
in which difference is resolved in favour of a rationally ordered ‘transcultural’ totality. This 
implicit momentum towards a universal consciousness constitutes our initial aporia in IC 
discourse; for the ontological impetus towards transculturalism in the form of an integrated 
human consciousness simultaneously implies closure, finitude and the resolution of difference 
within what is supposed to be an antinomic intercultural terrain.  In other words, by presupposing 
‘oneness’, IC discourse systematically effaces the premise of its own ontology – the irreducible 
relation to the other. Thus, by means of the passage from the many to the one, intercultural 
communication brings about its own dissolution. 
 
Truth and Transcendentalism  
To achieve these transformations, interculturalists frequently adopt an interventionist stance 
which appeals to the transcendental. That is, they contribute rhetorically and materially to the 
transnational public sphere in order to promote co-operation, reduce conflict and improve human 
rights (Phipps, 2007a; de Souza, 2006), and they do so by appealing to an implied higher order of 
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morality by which the differences that exist may be adjudicated and in some manner resolved. 
For example, referring to ‘critical cultural awareness’, Guilherme writes:  
 
[C]ritical cultural awareness […] may be defined as a reflective, exploratory, dialogical 
and active stance […] that allows for dissonance, contradiction, and conflict as well as 
for consensus, concurrence, and transformation. It is a cognitive and emotional 
endeavour that aims at individual and collective emancipation, social justice, and 
political commitment (2002, p. 218; original emphasis).  
 
 
Here Guilherme appeals, amongst other things, to transcendental ideals of emancipation and 
social justice as goals of critical cultural awareness. Taking a more explicitly interventionist and 
ethically motivated position, Salzman argues for a ‘just globalization’: 
 
What to do? We can work to build just world (sic) based on a ‘just globalization’ […]. 
We can, through education and enlightened representatives of our diverse humanity, 
make salient the affirmative, humane values existent in all religions and cultural 
traditions. We can work to make salient the ‘higher angels of our nature.’ The 
affirmative and high values of mercy, justice, love, and compassion exist and find 
correspondence across belief systems. It is these we must make salient from the pulpit 
to the school (2008, p. 326). 
 
Here Salzman makes explicit appeal to ‘high values’ in the transcendental plane as a means of 
solving the intercultural problems of the immanent plane – i.e. the plane of lived existence. The 
positions of Guilherme, Salzman and others can be regarded, then, as the ‘critical-
transformational’ ethical arm of IC discourse. Its spokespersons intend to increase people’s 
awareness of manipulation, exploitation, discrimination and abuse in the world against an (often) 
implied foundational ethical premise; and to move them to act upon it. This sense of 
transformational purpose sees the desedimentation of subjectivities as positive and productive, 
because it gives strength to the hope that, “things might be different some day” (Adorno, 1973, p. 
323).  For Giroux, this ethical interventionism is a principal role of the public intellectual: 
 
[W]e have obligations at least to inaugurate a discourse around the unrepresentable, that 
which cannot be spoken within social relations, particularly within groups that know 
that generally to speak is to be punished […]. [A]s a public intellectual I have the 
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obligation to rewrite the narratives of possibility for those who have occupied subject 
positions where that hasn’t been possible before (2005, p. 158). 
 
Why we have these obligations, and where they come from, is not made explicit by Giroux, or 
others, but is presupposed.  That they exist however is not in doubt – the implication in IC 
discourse is that they are transcendentally given.  
 
It is the legitimacy of these critical-transformational claims to truth that leads to our second 
aporia. As with any claim to truth, these propositions can imply a right to determine for others 
what counts as truth. Moreover, it remains unclear what distinguishes these truths from other 
‘truths’ to which a critical-transformational discourse is often opposed, such as economic 
neoliberalism and religious fundamentalism; and specifically what makes critical interventionist 
truths ‘truer’ than these others.  There is also the risk in what we are calling critical-
transformational truths that they simply become elements in a wider intercultural ‘meta-
narrative’ (Lyotard, 1984), an overarching template for explaining the intercultural whole. 
Problems arise when the meta-narrative encounters those whose own claims contradict its own. 
These might possibly include neo-conservatives, nationalist political parties and fundamentalist 
groups of any religious persuasion. If the discourse of these groups is at odds with critical-
transformational discourse, the following ‘aporetic’ questions arise: To what extent can a critical 
transformational discourse refuse to engage in a transformational dialogue with these others; and 
closely related to this, on what ethical grounds might it assert preference for its claims over the 
claims of these others? To address these questions it is necessary to explore a further set of 
grounds on which IC discourse can construct propositions and positions regarding prejudice, 
equality and human rights; and how it is possible to assert that a particular ‘intercultural’ claim 
should prevail. 
 
It seems to us that current articulations of the critical-transformational discourse of intercultural 
communication, as evidenced by Guilherme and Salzman above, are grounded in an implicit 
appeal to a transcendental signified. That is, a noumenon or ‘moral theism’ existing outside 
human experience, against which intercultural claims can be measured and judgements made.  In 
the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/2003), Kant saw the operation of the moral noumenon as a 
priori to the world, and distilled it in his work in terms of a faith that it was there. That is, he 
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believed that it existed, but also that it was impossible to step outside our world to see it, know it 
or experience it.  This led Kant into moral contradiction, which despite the categorical imperative 
he was never satisfactorily able to overcome.  With regard to intercultural communication this 
Kantian aporia is revisited primarily through the discourse of tolerance, e.g.: 
 
There is little question that in the post September 11 cultural landscape, the need for 
tolerance among peoples of different faiths has become more urgent, especially in the 
war-torn Middle East, where religion inspired violence often turns homicidal and 
catastrophic (Abramovich, 2005: 295). 
 
Similarly, drawing on the work of Berlin (1990), Byram (2006) proposes adjudicating between, 
“[cultural] values which one can condone, and those which are ‘beyond the pale’ of human 
reason and value” by reference to the (transcendental) principles contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (p. 125). 
 
Due to its emphasis on the ‘need for tolerance’, IC discourse finds itself in a Kantian moral bind. 
By asserting the claim that tolerance is the preferred ethical option, but being unable to give 
grounds – other than transcendentally – for why this is so, the truth which such a claim 
presupposes becomes reduced to that of an opinion. If this truth is indeed an opinion, then not 
only is intercultural communication misleading itself about the implied universality of the ethic 
of tolerance, it also puts itself in the position of not having immanent – i.e. ‘here and now’ 
grounds for adjudicating between competing truth claims. In this paper we understand the 
immanent to consist of the world within our possible lived experience of it.  Just as the immanent 
critique of the Frankfurt School (e.g. Adorno, 1967, 1973) was concerned with critiquing the 
object on its own terms – i.e. from within – so an immanent critique of the ethics of cultural 
practice must navigate without the assured moral compass of tolerance to guide it.  The implicit 
universal moral imperative of tolerance is a danger to interculturalists because it can lead in 
principle to ethical paralysis and inertia, particularly in the face of exorbitant acts of the other 
which on the aforesaid grounds they feel obliged against reason to condone. In our present times 
these include practices such as vaginal circumcision, wearing of the niqab, linguistic engineering 
(e.g. California’s Proposition 227), culture-based homophobia and the fetishism of the female 
form. Where the instinct is to react against such practices, interculturalists have relied too much 
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for their interventions on the transcendental idealism of Enlightenment thinking and the 
universalities of equality and human rights. If our responses to the cultural acts of the other are to 
become more ethically consistent, we need to devise explicit and persuasive immanent – as 
opposed to transcendental – grounds for the positions which we take so that we may not only 
adopt a more inwrought and intrinsic ethical stance, but still also move to ethical judgement as 
part of a necessary and ongoing reflexive intercultural praxis. 
 
Totality and Terror 
This Enlightenment desire for plenitude and its appeal to transcendental idealism gives rise to 
similarly dramatic, yet philosophically distinct responses from Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques 
Derrida. Levinas sees it as ‘totality’ linked to violence and terror: “The visage of being that 
shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality” (1969/2007, p. 21).  While Kant posited a 
priori transcendental concepts for the understanding of phenomena and the sensory intuition of 
space and time, for Levinas the processes of reason are executed through human consciousness, 
the cogito. Through the process of rationality, the other is constituted by perceptual noesis that 
obtains to the knowing subject. On this argument, in order to understand or to communicate 
purposefully with another person, we exercise our powers of reason upon them. However, 
through the very exercise of rational understanding we reduce the other to who we are, and the 
other becomes “part of the same” (1969/2007). The attempt to understand other people through 
categorizing, objectifying knowledge not only denies the immediacy and potential of the one-to-
one relationship with others – “beings in the openness of being” – but also serves to dominate 
and possess them. In so doing, we carry out a “partial negation” of the other which constitutes an 
“act of  violence” (1997, p. 8). 
 
Derrida’s critique of totality arises from the violence of language and signification residing in the 
logocentric workings of the Saussurean sign (Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1988).  In the first 
instance, the union of the signifier and the signified seems to satisfy a desire for a certain type of 
fulfilment, that of having a sound or mark which can be used to refer to a concept. But having 
seemingly named the concept, we find that the concept has no meaning except in its difference 
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from other signs, as there are no self-identical words or signs.  Derrida names this différance; 
différance entails that there are no pure signs – “there is no experience consisting of pure 
presence” (1988, p. 10; original emphasis).  For example, the ‘inside’ can never be a pure inside, 
because it is dependent on there being an ‘outside’.  For this reason Derrida demonstrates how 
the essence of the signified must be formally prior to the sign, and that fulfilment, or ‘pure 
presence’, cannot be claimed except by making recourse “in favour of a meaning supposedly 
antecedent to différance, more original than it, exceeding and governing it in the last analysis.  
This is […] the presence of what we called […] the ‘transcendental signified’ (Derrida, 1981, p. 
29).  On these terms the transcendental signified is the signified to which all signifiers ultimately 
refer; it is the place where meaning comes to rest in itself.  If the transcendental signified is prior 
to the sign, it is, like Kant’s noumenon, a-discursive and a-historical, outside our experience, 
unknowable. The transcendental signified is the object of the human longing for fulfilment and 
plenitude – a craving for the unfulfilled unity of the sign itself. 
 
The longing for presence does violence to the sign by seeking to ‘fix’ its concepts against the 
transcendental signified. For Derrida, this is an impossibility. The transcendental signified is not 
present to us, it is outside the text, of which there is “no outside” (Derrida, 1976, p. 156).  
Meaning, therefore, cannot be ‘fixed’.  In place of the absent signified, Derrida posits an endless 
chain of signifiers, one referring to the other ad infinitum:  
 
The meaning of meaning … is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of 
signifier to signifier … its force is a certain pure and infinite equivocality which 
gives signified meaning no respite, no rest, but engages in its own economy so that 
it always signifies again and differs (1978, p. 29).   
 
This entails that no meaning can ever be fully grasped in its entirety, in its full presence, because 
signifiers only refer and time does stop for them.   
 
For critical-transformational interculturalists to make (implied) foundational claims about justice, 
tolerance and understanding is to do unintended violence to these concepts; for by 
unintentionally ‘fixing’ their meaning they potentially close them down. They also run into the 
danger of arrogating to themselves privileged access to the noumenal signified, the signified 
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outside. Asserting such entitlements is dangerous since the claims which ensue may then become 
organising principles, i.e. ‘truths’, against which the claims of others can then be judged. When a 
claim becomes an organising principle, it finds itself in conflict with other dissenting claims, and 
reacts with violence towards them.  The western alliance’s ‘War on Terror’ and the Jihadism of 
Al-Qaeda are both examples of claims which are being used in this way. They each represent a 
will to truth which colonises the discursive terrain according to its own perceptions, based as 
they are on the presupposed obviousness of their own moral privilege.  
 
Alterity, Difference and Signification  
The second part of this paper responds to the twin aporias identified above. To address the first, 
relating to the implications of a universal consciousness, we explore after Levinas (1969/2007, 
1998/2009) the possibility of a non-totalising relationship between the self and the other. For 
Levinas, the source of the self is incontrovertibly located in its relation with the other. This 
subverts and supersedes the ontology of being as an autonomous ‘existent’ and challenges the 
orthodox ontology of presence that has underwritten western philosophy from Descartes to 
Heidegger, namely the self-consciousness of the self in its being in the world.   For Levinas, the 
self is inextricably bound up with the other in as much as the same is unable to exist in its 
absence: “the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-
the-world within the ontology of sameness” (Levinas in Kearney 2004, p. 75). Furthermore, 
while in Hegelian thought the historical apogee of the relation between self and other entails the 
erasure of difference and the reconciliation of the self and other in the attainment of universal 
consciousness, for Levinas the maintenance of distance and separation through time is 
fundamental to existence: “a relation with a reality infinitely distant from my own reality, yet 
without this distance destroying this relation and without this relation destroying this distance” 
(1969/2007, p. 41). This irreducible space gives rise to the ‘infinitely distant’ nature of the 
relation between same and other; while the surplus of being which the other presents to the same 
gives rise to its property of ‘transascendence’.  
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The infinite and trans(a)scendent properties of this relation, then, do not entail the other being 
positioned in a negative, ‘antithetical’ relation to the self; but rather the self being aligned in a 
positive, constitutive relation with the other:  
 
[T]he separation of the same with regard to the other […] cannot rest on an 
opposition to the other which would be purely antithetical. Thesis and antithesis, in 
repelling one another, call for one another. They appear in opposition to a synoptic 
gaze that encompasses them; they already form a totality which, by integrating the 
metaphysical transcendence expressed by the idea of infinity, relativises it. An 
absolute transcendence has to be produced as non-integratable [...]. Correlation 
does not suffice as a category for transcendence (1969/2007, p. 53; original 
emphasis). 
 
On this argument the ‘non-integratability’ of same and other becomes the originary condition for 
selfhood, and hence the milieu for the development of subjectivity.  
 
Like contemporary interculturalists, Levinas describes the relation between the self and the other 
as being ‘accomplished’ through language (1969/2007). For Phipps (2007b) intercultural 
pedagogy is more a process of becoming through ‘languaging’ with the other, rather than an 
edifice of knowledge and understanding about the other.  However unlike many interculturalists, 
this relation is not a symmetrical one, but rather is “such that the other, despite the relation with 
the same, remains transcendent to the same” (Levinas, 1969/2007, p. 39). Furthermore, while the 
idea of the ‘cultural’ emerged from language education as a necessary contextualization of a 
priori linguistic systems (Corbett, 2003), for Levinas the relationship between self and other is 
autochthonous. Language arises from this ‘pre-existing’ relation and realizes it through arguably 
its most immediate form, speech. For the relation between self and other is “primordially enacted 
as conversation, where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as an ‘I’, as a particular existent 
unique and autochthonous, leaves itself” (1969/2007, p. 39). These forms of relational selfhood 
are not suspended until some eschatological, Hegelian future; but are located in the immanence 
of interhuman relations lived out in the here and now.  
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Truth and the Ethical Relation 
This section addresses our second aporia, the implicit transcendental appeal of a critical-
transformational discourse. On this argument, if judgemental truths are caught up in the 
metaphysical complicity of a signed universe which cannot be critiqued without recourse to the 
sign itself – that is from the inside (Derrida, 1978), the premise for judgemental critique must 
also be derived from within a system of knowledge in which ethical concepts are not outside 
dependent, i.e. based on transcendentals.  In order to push ethical practice along this internal path 
Levinas distinguishes between two interdependent dimensions of the relation between self and 
other: the interhuman and the ethical. 
 
The interhuman relationship emerges with our history, without being-in-the-world as 
intelligibility and presence. But it can also be considered from another perspective... – 
which transcends the Greek language of intelligibility – as a theme of justice and concern 
for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire which carries us beyond the finite 
Being of the world as presence.  The interhuman is thus an interface: where what is ‘of 
the world’ qua phenomenological intelligibility is juxtaposed with what is ‘not of the 
world’ qua ethical responsibility (Levinas in Kearney, 2004, p. 74).  
 
The interhuman dimension is again familiar to us from those sciences in which humans are 
viewed “as citizens, as individuals, as a multiplicity in a genus”. From this perspective, the study 
of intercultural communication has veered towards a concern with knowledge and functionality, 
rather than with truth and justice. However, on Levinas’s account, ethics precedes ontology as 
‘first philosophy’:  
 
Pre-existing the disclosure of being in general taken as the basis of knowledge and as 
meaning of being is the relation with the existent that expresses himself (sic); preexisting 
the place of ontology is the ethical plane (1969/2007, p. 201).  
The theme of “justice and concern for the other as other” disrupts the ontology of presence by 
always already preceding it and providing the grounds for ethical relations between human 
beings.  
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This ethical movement towards the human other is always preferable as difference than as unity: 
“sociality [...] is better than fusion”.  It is this irreducible other that Levinas names ‘the face’ 
(1969/2007, pp. 194-201); and the approach of the self to the face is the location of the ethical 
core of this relationship, “the most basic mode of responsibility”. The face of the other summons 
the ‘I’  through language, and invokes the obligation of the self to the other. 
 
The ethical ‘I’ is subjectivity precisely insofar as it kneels before the other, 
sacrificing its own liberty to the more primordial call of the other...As soon as I 
acknowledge that it is ‘I’ who is responsible, I accept that my freedom is 
anteceded by an obligation to the other (Levinas in Kearney, 2004, p. 78).  
 
In this way, Levinas’s conceptualization of ‘the face’ offers a critical-transformational 
interculturalism grounds for an ethics arising from the immanence of the relationship with the 
other rather than through a Kantian appeal to a transcendental moral signified. 
 
Levinas goes on to argue that the responsibility of the self for the other is accomplished by its 
capacity to substitute itself for the other. In an expiative description, the self is described as 
‘accused’, as ‘persecuted’, as ‘a hostage’: “...under accusation by everyone, the responsibility for 
everyone goes to the point of substitution” (1998/2009, p. 112).  On this argument, the principles 
for action in relation to the other do not proceed from an ontologically bounded self that projects 
itself towards the other through an appeal to a set of transcendental ideals; but rather emanate 
from an asymmetrical relationship in which the self is positioned in an ethical relation of 
responsibility for the other.  
 
Responsibility for another...precedes essence in it...I have not done anything and 
have always been under accusation – persecution. The ipseity, in the passivity 
with arche characteristic of identity, is a hostage (1998/2009, pp. 114-115). 
 
Moreover, this ethical relation gives rise ‘primordially’ to the grounds of signification: “an 
exposure to the other, it is signification, is signification itself, the one-to-the-other to the point of 
substitution, but a substitution in separation, that is responsibility” (1998/2009, p. 54).  These are 
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posited as fundamental to human existence in an ‘inversion’ of identity which ‘escapes’ 
conventional ‘relations’ in as much as these relations presume ontology. 
Towards a Discourse Ethics of Responsibility  
We have identified two aporias within IC discourse: one emerges from its implicit impetus 
towards a universal consciousness, which is in contradiction with its declared principles of 
openness, tolerance and difference; the other arises from its grounds for truth being implicitly 
based on an appeal to a transcendental moral theism. The second part of this paper has attempted 
to circumvent these aporias, first, by outlining a more immanent relation between self and other 
in order to supersede the implication of universal consciousness; and second, by proposing that 
there is a way of reconstructing an intercultural praxis so that it is no longer dependent upon 
idealist claims to truth. 
 
This ethical relation of responsibility is adopted and extended in the later work of Derrida (1999, 
2001; Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000); and from this it is possible to extrapolate further 
immanent grounds for a critical-transformational intercultural praxis. On Derrida’s account, 
without an infinite responsibility to the other, “you would not have moral and political problems, 
and everything that follows from this” (in Critchley, 1999, p. 108). In other words, it is through 
responsibility, rather than through the foundationalist presuppositions of presence, that the 
discursive terrain remains open and that a non-normative ethics becomes possible. Without 
responsibility, the hope which is carried in the possibility of the other that things might be 
different one day, as well as the praxis which such hope implies, would be denied. By drawing 
on responsibility for the other, and therefore to a commitment to openness rather than closure, 
the point is not to determine whether different truth claims are good or bad, but whether putting a 
particular discourse or set of discourses into practice might lead to a silencing of open 
alternatives; and therefore also a turning away from the other. That these alternatives should be 
open makes it possible for IC discourse to locate itself in opposition to perspectives and practices 
which interculturalists would normally associate with closure and intolerance, while 
simultaneously seeking to exercise reflexive support for more open alternatives, not because they 
know it is right to do so but because they know that not to do so would be an act of 
irresponsibility. In this way, the praxis of intercultural communication is able to supersede a 
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universalist telos of tolerance, understanding and reconciliation by reaching a new (and ever-
renewable) accommodation with the other, one which moves the discussion with the other on 
without reaching a conclusion. This then provides the grounds for denying the alterity of the 
other, when that alterity presents itself as received and final – in extremis and exorbitant – as in 
the widespread cultural presentation of homosexuality as ‘sin’, the linguistic engineering of 
California’s Proposition 227, and the culturally-legitimated oppression of women by means of 
the niqab, vaginal circumcision and the fetishism of the female form.  There have to be grounds 
for questioning the supposedly culturally unquestionable, and for not welcoming the evidently 
unwelcome. The grounds for this are immanent rather than transcendental, and are based upon 
principles of openness and responsibility as ethical bulwarks against discursive closure and 
cultural introversion. 
 
 
We therefore propose (after Levinas and Derrida, op. cit.) a discourse ethics of responsibility 
whereby it becomes possible for an intercultural praxis to engage critically and transformatively 
with regard to the exorbitant cultural acts of the other. This does not entail that interculturalists 
must automatically forgive in the moment that they are summoned to forgiveness; but rather that 
they must consider whether their forgiveness might entail a sanctioning of the other’s practice, 
and a closure and acceptance of eschatological finitude.  Nor does it entail that interculturalists 
should accept the unacceptable just as they accept other acts of the other. In intercultural 
responsibility ‘tolerance’ is rejected; for tolerance is a form of charity.  As Derrida puts it: 
 
If I think I am being hospitable because I am being tolerant, it is because I wish 
to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the limits of my 
‘home’, my sovereignty, my ‘I can’ (my territory, my house, my language, my 
culture, my religion, and so on) (2003, p. 128). 
 
Tolerance declares to the other that their acts are being entertained under sufferance, and that 
these acts are at one and the same time subject to a privileged hegemonic order of the self. 
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The extremis and exorbitant acts of the other which are in conflict with an intercultural discourse 
that is obliged against reason to countenance them, are unacceptable because of the way in which 
truth is employed to justify their perpetration.  The employment of truth as an organising 
principle leads to an iteration of certain types of practice which over time pass under the banner 
of ‘tradition’.  Religion does this by claiming a moral foundation in tradition, science by 
claiming an unquestioned, self-legitimating universality.  In both cases a privileged signified is 
employed as truth, and by this means each closes itself off from public interrogation.  What this 
suggests is that tradition in intercultural communication should never be accepted as giving 
privileged warrant for any type of cultural practice, but should always be rigorously questioned, 
problematised and deconstructed.   
 
In conclusion, while we may not be able to supersede the aporias in IC discourse which we have 
identified, there are alternative pathways through which it is perhaps possible to circumvent 
them. To avoid the Hegelian impetus towards universal consciousness implicit in IC discourse 
we posit an irreducible distance and separation between the self and other; in so doing not only 
are we able to bypass the field’s implicit appeal to the transcendental as the source of truth but 
also to counter the exorbitant claims and actions – out of ‘tradition’ – of the (intercultural) other. 
Thus, the ethical grounds for intercultural praxis derive from an immanent “non-reciprocal 
relation of responsibility” between the self and the other (Bettina, 2008). In “the human struggle 
to make meaning” (Phipps, 2007b, p.19), it is necessary to strive not to finish with just the one – 
but all the time to keep a reflexive eye on the many.  This way, the radical otherness of the other 
is preserved; for a critical intercultural praxis keeps the space between same and the other open 
in expectation and hope without ever needing arrival and acceptance.  In intercultural 
communication we are obligated to sustain an incitement to responsibility and all that this 
entails, because, following Derrida, “pure unity or pure multiplicity […] is a synonym of death” 
(1997, p. 13).  In our quest for the intercultural we therefore favour the multiple over the 
singular, the variable over the stable and the mess over the arranged. 
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